WAKE UP - STOP BERMIMPI ANDA DAPAT BERINVESTASI LAYAKNYA WARREN BUFFET DI $IHSG :innocent: - Part 3

Prinsip bagaimana Buffet berinventasi pada pos sebelumnya https://stockbit.com/post/2568082 pasti telah banyak diulas oleh berbagai PENULIS BUKU INVESTASI maupun PENJUAL SEMINAR :sunglasses:

Namun ... sebenarnya kalau anda cari dari puluhan buku yang menulis tentang Buffet Ways ... DITULIS OLEH ORANG LAIN dan bukan oleh Buffet sendiri.

Padahal ... the BEST WAY TO LEARN FROM GURU ... adalah melalui membaca dan memahami HASIL KARYA GURU TERSEBUT directly instead melalui pihak ketiga ... TOO BAD :yum:

Namun ... KALAU ANDA JELI ... sebenarnya BUFFET memberikan insightnya selama ini directly melalui "ANNUAL LETTER TO SHAREHOLDER" yang merupakan WISDOWN DIRECTLY FROM OMAHA GURU :wink:

Kalau selama ini anda MENGAKU NGAKU sebagai DISCIPLE BUFFET namun tidak pernah membaca sama sekali ANNUAL LETTER beliau ... Well ... sangat disayangkan ... karena sesungguhnya banyak pelajaran di dalamnya mengenai "BAGAIMANA BUFFET BERPIKIR DAN MEMILIH STOCK?" :grin: - This is CROWN JEWEL -

Saya ambil cuplikan "Perusahaan Apa yang Buffet cari" dari Annual Letter yang dirilis di tahun 2008 oleh beliau :

Let’s take a look at what kind of businesses turn us on. And while we’re at it, let’s also discuss what we wish to avoid.

Charlie and I look for companies that have a) a business we understand; b) favorable long-term economics; c) able and trustworthy management; and d) a sensible price tag. We like to buy the whole business or, if management is our partner, at least 80%. When control-type purchases of quality aren’t available, though, we are also happy to simply buy small portions of great businesses by way of stock market purchases. It’s better to have a part interest in the Hope Diamond than to own all of a rhinestone.

A truly great business must have an enduring moat that protects excellent returns on invested capital. The dynamics of capitalism guarantee that competitors will repeatedly assault any business castle that is earning high returns. Therefore a formidable barrier such as a company’s being the low cost producer (GEICO, Costco) or possessing a powerful world-wide brand (Coca-Cola, Gillette, American Express) is essential for sustained success. Business history is filled with Roman Candles, companies whose moats proved illusory and were soon crossed.

Our criterion of enduring causes us to rule out companies in industries prone to rapid and continuous change. Though capitalism’s creative destruction is highly beneficial for society, it precludes investment certainty. A moat that must be continuously rebuilt will eventually be no moat at all.

Additionally, this criterion eliminates the business whose success depends on having a great manager. Of course, a terrific CEO is a huge asset for any enterprise, and at Berkshire we have an abundance of these managers. Their abilities have created billions of dollars of value that would never have materialized if typical CEOs had been running their businesses.

But if a business requires a superstar to produce great results, the business itself cannot be deemed great. A medical partnership led by your area’s premier brain surgeon may enjoy outsized and growing earnings, but that tells little about its future. The partnership’s moat will go when the surgeon goes. You can count, though, on the moat of the Mayo Clinic to endure, even though you can’t name its CEO.

Long-term competitive advantage in a stable industry is what we seek in a business. If that comes with rapid organic growth, great. But even without organic growth, such a business is rewarding. We will simply take the lush earnings of the business and use them to buy similar businesses elsewhere. There’s no rule that you have to invest money where you’ve earned it. Indeed, it’s often a mistake to do so: Truly great businesses, earning huge returns on tangible assets, can’t for any extended period reinvest a large portion of their earnings internally at high rates of return.

Dengan memahami poinx2 beliau di atas, idealnya anda tahu bagaimana Buffet memilih stock :sunglasses:

Lebih lanjut pada Annual letter untuk shareholder di 2013, Buffet berkata :

When Charlie and I buy stocks – which we think of as small portions of businesses – our analysis is very similar to that which we use in buying entire businesses. We first have to decide whether we can sensibly estimate an earnings range for five years out, or more. If the answer is yes, we will buy the stock (or business) if it sells at a reasonable price in relation to the bottom boundary of our estimate. If, however, we lack the ability to estimate future earnings – which is usually the case – we simply move on to other prospects. In the 54 years we have worked together, we have never foregone an attractive purchase because of the macro or political environment, or the views of other people. In fact, these subjects never come up when we make decisions. 

It’s vital, however, that we recognize the perimeter of our circle of competence and stay well inside of it. Even then, we will make some mistakes, both with stocks and businesses. But they will not be the disasters that occur, for example, when a long-rising market induces purchases that are based on anticipated price behavior and a desire to be where the action is.

Pada surat di atas, Buffet menyampaikan informasi tambahan tentang INVESTING ...

Dan sebenarnya kalau anda membaca Annual Letter terdahulu di 1987 anda juga akan memahami bagaimana beliau memilih stock :

Whenever Charlie and I buy common stocks for Berkshire… we approach the transaction as if we were buying into a private business. We look at the economic prospects of the business, the people in charge of running it, and the price we must pay. We do not have in mind any time or price for sale. Indeed, we are willing to hold a stock indefinitely so long as we expect the business to increase in intrinsic value at a satisfactory rate. When investing, we view ourselves as business analysts – not as market analysts, not as macroeconomic analysts, and not even as security analysts.

Our approach makes an active trading market useful, since it periodically presents us with mouth-watering opportunities. But by no means is it essential: a prolonged suspension of trading in the securities we hold would not bother us any more than does the lack of daily quotations on [our subsidiary companies that do not trade on the stock exchange]. Eventually, our economic fate will be determined by the economic fate of the business we own, whether our ownership is partial or total.

….

In my opinion, investment success will not be produced by arcane formulae, computer programs or signals flashed by the price behavior of stocks and markets. Rather an investor will succeed by coupling good business judgment with an ability to insulate his thoughts and behavior from the super-contagious emotions that swirl about the marketplace.

Charlie and I let our marketable equities tell us by their operating results – not by their daily, or even yearly, price quotations – whether our investments are successful. The market may ignore business success for a while, but eventually will confirm it. As Ben [Graham] said: “In the short run, the market is a voting machine but in the long run it is a weighing machine.” The speed at which a business’s success is recognized, furthermore, is not that important as long as the company’s intrinsic value is increasing at a satisfactory rate. In fact, delayed recognition can be an advantage: It may give us the chance to buy more of a good thing at a bargain price.

Sometimes, of course, the market may judge a business to be more valuable than the underlying facts would indicate it is. In such a case, we will sell our holdings. Sometimes, also, we will sell a security that is fairly valued or even undervalued because we require funds for a still more undervalued investment or one we believe we understand better.

We need to emphasize, however, that we do not sell holdings just because they have appreciated or because we have held them for a long time. (Of Wall Street maxims the most foolish may be “You can’t go broke taking a profit.”) We are quite content to hold any security indefinitely, so long as the prospective return on equity capital of the underlying business is satisfactory, management is competent and honest, and the market does not overvalue the business.

…

We really don’t see many fundamental differences between the purchase of a controlled business and the purchase of marketable holdings such as [GEICO, The Washington Post & Capital Cities / ABC]. In each case we try to buy into businesses with favorable long-term economics. Our goal is to find an outstanding business at a sensible price, not a mediocre business at a bargain price. Charlie and I have found that making silk purses out of silk is the best that we can do; with sow’s ears, we fail.

…

In making both control purchases and stock purchases, we try to buy not only good businesses, but ones run by high-grade, talented and likeable managers.

Many commentators, however, have drawn an incorrect conclusion upon observing recent events: They are fond of saying that the small investor has no chance in a market now dominated by the erratic behavior of the big boys. This conclusion is dead wrong: Such markets are ideal for any investor – small or large – so long as he sticks to his investment knitting. Volatility caused by money managers who speculate irrationally with huge sums will offer the true investor more chances to make intelligent investment moves. He can be hurt by such volatility only if he is forced, by either financial or psychological pressures, to sell at untoward times.

Pada Annual Letter tahun 1996 beliau menulis knowledge yang diperlukan oleh investor :

To invest successfully, you need not understand beta, efficient markets, modern portfolio theory, option pricing or emerging markets. You may, in fact, be better off knowing nothing of these. That, of course, is not the prevailing view at most business schools, whose finance curriculum tends to be dominated by such subjects. In our view, though, investment students need only two well-taught courses – How to Value a Business, and How to Think About Market Prices.

Dan Pada Tahun 1997, beliau menyampaikan bagaimana pandangannya terhadap fluktuasi harga di pasar

If you expect to be a net saver during the next five years, should you hope for a higher or lower stock market during that period? Many investors get this one wrong. Even though they are going to be net buyers of stocks for many years to come, they are elated when stock prices rise and depressed when they fall. In effect, they rejoice because prices have risen for the “hamburgers” they will soon be buying. This reaction makes no sense. Only those who will be sellers of equities in the near future should be happy at seeing stocks rise. Prospective purchasers should much prefer sinking prices.

Sayang sekali bagi ANDA YANG MENGAKU sebagai DISCIPLE BUFFET namun ANDA TIDAK PERNAH MEMBACA dan MEMAHAMI ANNUAL LETTER BELIAU yang tersedia SECARA FREE sejak tahun 1977 di link berikut

http://bit.ly/1M7OrN1

SO ... YOU CAN'T INVEST LIKE BUFFET IF YOU DON'T LEARN DIRECTLY FROM HIS OWN WORD :innocent:


SHARING: https://stockbit.com/post/2548232
ROBO: https://stockbit.com/post/2500422
Cheers :wine_glass: